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Editorial Comment
Four years ago The Catholic Lawyer opened its pages to a continu-
ing colloquium among experts in law, history, philosophy and theology
as a means of clarifying thought in the essential areas wherein a public
philosophy of law must lie. It was hopefully envisaged that as a result
of the exchange of such ideas, a dialogue might be established between
Catholics and non-Catholics alike, aimed at a consensus on truths com-
monly held by the American people.
In line with this undertaking, the current issue of The Catholic Lawyer
highlights a new aspect of the colloquium-a detailed examination, for
the first time, of the non-Thomist natural law theories of one of the fore-
most non-Catholic legal philosophers of our times-Lon Luvois Fuller.
Professor Fuller, in the opinion of many scholars, would be an ideal
participant in any cooperative venture between the "integrative Juris-
prude" and the Thomist for the more effective elaboration of natural
law theory and its possible application as an American philosophy of
law.
As a preliminary to the publication of this examination, which was
undertaken by Father Charles Palms, C.S.P., it was felt that added value
would accrue to it if Professor Fuller were granted an opportunity to
criticize it prior to publication and to make his comments known to our
readers. Accordingly, galleys of the article were sent to him for his
opinion.
Professor Fuller expressed his pleasure with the article, and lauded
its veracity. He did suggest, however, a single change in emphasis-he
would put more stress on the distinction between the internal and the
external morality of the law. According to Professor Fuller:
Many overlook this point in my exchange with Hart, and say simply that
I took the view that a legal system can be so 'bad' that it is not law at all.
But in my exchange with Hart I took the more cautious approach of say-
ing that parts of Nazi law were so badly conceived and administered,
measured by the standard of the law's internal morality, that they could
be said not to be law at all. All this without reference to the nefarious
objectives at which this Nazi 'law' was aimed.
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Apropos of the foregoing observations it can be said that Professor
Fuller proposes human purpose as the mediating principle which tests the
morality of all human conduct and which tests the law itself as a product
of that conduct. He asserts that law is tested by those principles of
social order which will enable men to attain a satisfactory life in com-
mon. He conceives that the one central aim common to all the schools
of natural law is the discovery of those principles. All theories of
natural law, he says, accept the possibility of "discovery" of the pur-
poses for which men act in social concert.
However, to explain the relation of law and morals in terms of a
mediating principle seems, to Father William Cahill, writing in a past
issue of The Catholic Lawyer,1 an undue concession to the positivistic
position. Such an explanation seems to accept as its point of departure
the positivistic view that the legal order and the moral order do not have
the same foundation, and, in this light, the mediating principle appears
to be less than fundamental.
The Thomistic philosophy of law and morals postulates a common
foundation for both orders. The orders are then differentiated-rather
than mediated-by principles derived from the concept of rational co-
ercibility.
Both law and morals are orders of conduct. The conduct to be or-
dered is conduct which can be performed consciously and voluntarily,
and thus, the order to be imposed upon such conduct and the norms of
that order must be rational. Though non-rational concomitants can aid
the effectiveness of conduct consciously determined, no norm can have
basic effectiveness in ordering such conduct unless the norm rationally
erects rational purposes to guide human choice.
Professor Fuller's phrase "purposes for which men act" seems to limit
the area of reality in which reason can discover purposes for human con-
duct. The area he contemplates seems to be that which includes only
the purposes to which the men of a given community have given posi-
tive, de facto recognition. This looks to Father Cahill like an exchange
of legal positivism for moral positivism.
For a Thomistic Aristotelian, the area into which reason pushes its
search for purposes to be imposed by law has a dimension beyond that
which Professor Fuller describes. Reason can, and does, discover such
purposes by recognizing that some purposes are proposed to man by
the constitution of his nature. Reason perceives that unless a man
adopts these purposes, he cannot be fully a man. The ultimate reach
of reason's voyage of discovery into nature achieves the recognition of
God as nature's intelligent Creator. Here reason grasps the conclusion
1 Cahill, One Phase of the New Debate on the Iniquitous Law, 5 CATHOLIC LAW.
119 (1959).
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that the purposes which nature, through reason, tells man to make his
own in order to be a perfect man are, in fact, the purposes of God. Thus
it appears that by embracing these purposes man achieves and perfects
his personal relation with God, reciprocating God's love for him ex-
pressed in the acts by which 'God creates and conserves him.
Elsewhere in this issue is an enlightening application of natural law
principles to the current problems of civil disobedience, particularly
with respect to Southern segregation legislation. Originally appearing in
the Autumn 1964 issue of the Kentucky Law Journal, it is of special
interest to those readers of The Catholic Lawyer who recall with pleas-
ure the scholarly articles by Professor MacGuigan which have appeared
in our past issues. These articles have consistently demonstrated his
superior ability to apply Thomistic natural law principles to today's
social problems, and to arrive at sound solutions in the practical order.
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